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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
ROY FREE. 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
YS. 
SWEN C. JENSEN, CHRIS JENSEN, 
AND ALMA JENSEN, His Wife, AND 
REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL 
CREDIT CORPORATION OF SALT 
LAKE CITY, UTAH, a Corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Appeal From District Court of the Second Judicial 
Di~trid, in and For Davis County, 
State of Utah. 
Honorable Lester A. 'Vade, Judge 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
'rhe appellants, Swen C. Jensen, Chris Jensen and 
Alma Jensen and Regional Agricultural Credit 
Corporation claim, in their brief, that plaintiff 
herein acquired no title by his deed from Davis 
County to the land in question. They contend first, 
that the auditor's tax deed is void hecause it was 
hased upon a tax sale for delinquent taxes for the 
yenr 1933 which defendantc; claim were paid, and 
wa~. in legal effect, a r~edemption, and, second, that 
tl1R title plnintiff holds, if any. WRR acquired as the 
HQ'Pnt of or in trnst for defenchmt Alice Farnworth. 
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1. 
Several pages of appellants' brief are devoted to 
the proposition that tue tax deed in question is void 
because of mis-description of this land in certain of 
the tax pr9ceeding1s. The only evidence before the 
Court, relative to these tax proceedlngs, is plain-
tiff's Exhibit A which is a published notice o[ the 
May sale, plaintiff's ~xhibit B which is the cer-
tificate of sale, plaintiff's ~xhibit U which is the 
auditor's tax deed and plaintiff's Exhibit E which 
is the check of J. R. Free to Davis County in the 
sun1 of $656.30, the latter representing the purchase 
price of the tax title; and also a reference by de-
fendants to the 1935 assessment roll of Davis 
County, page 58, line 34, which shows the descrip-
tion last above mentioned of the land in question. 
We shall first call the Court's attention to Sec-
tion 80-10-35 of the Revised Statutes, which pro-
vides this form to be used for tax sale certificates, 
and concludes : 
''The certificate of sale ~igned by the 
county treasurer is prima facie evidence of 
the regularity of all proceedings connectetl 
with the assessment, notice. equalization, 
levies, advertisement and sale of the prop-
erty therein described, and the burden of 
showing any irregularity in any of the pro-
CPedings rPsulting in the sale of property 
for the nonpayment of' delinquent taxes 
shall he on him who asserts it." 
The certificate of sale here de1scribed the land in 
question as follows: 
Beg. NE cor. of Sec. 34, Twp. 2 N. Rg. 1 W, 
S. L. :M., R. 22-517 rds; Vl to .J ord1n River; 
N a long E bank to N line of SeC'. iJ3, E to 
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3 
beg. cont. 80 A. Also beg. 22-517 rds. S 
fr. NE oor. of above Sec. S 52-1/3 rds. \\ .. to · 
Jordan River; N along E bank of river to 
a pt. 22-5/7 rds. S fr. N line of Sec 33 E to 
beg. cont. 183 A. 
Counsel argue that the ''above section'' in the sec-
ond part of the description means Section 33. The 
first description refers to the Northeast corner and 
so does the second description, the first starting at 
the Northeast corner and the other 22.5 rods south 
of the Northeast corner. The meaning of the de-
scription can, we think, be readily ascertained, with-
out conjecture, from the description itself and with-
out resort to extraneous evidence; and it meets the 
test stated in 
Tintic Undine ~fining Company v. Ercan-
brack, 93 Ut. 561; 74 P. (2d) 11S41 
as follows: 
''The description must be definite enough 
for the lien to attach to the property with-
out extraneous evidence. '' 
The delinquent list was not introduced in evidence, 
and for that.reason it must be presumed that the de-
scription in the certificate of sale was taken from 
the delinquent list and harmonizes with it. The 
delinquent list f.or the year 1933 has disappeared, 
and cannot be found in the proper records of Davis 
County, and we are entitled to presume that in its 
description of the land in question, it was the same 
as in the certificate of sale; and seeo111dary evidence 
of the list was not offered. But even if the de-
scription in the published list were as set out in the 
answer of thfl' defendants Jensen (Ab. 15), it was 
sufficient under this Court's interpretation of 
Rev. Sts. Utah, 1933, 80-11-6. wl1ich reads 
a~ foHow:;;: 
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''In the assessment of land or the adver-
tisement and sale thereof for taxes, initial 
letters, abbreviations and figures may be 
used to designate the township, range, sec-
tion, or parts of sections." (And see Bur-
ton v. Hoover, 93 Ut. 498, 74 P. (2d) 652). 
_o\s to the contention that the property had been 
1mproperly assess.ed, let us go directly to the assess-
ment for the year 1933. Counsel admit that the 
property then stood in the name of James Farn-
worth. It is that year that respondent's tax title 
is based; and it is for that year's taxes that the 
property was sold. 
Section 80-10-40 provides as follows: 
''In case property assessed for taxes i~ 
sold to the County, it must be ass·essed in 
subsequent year~ for taxes in the same 
manner as if it had not been sold. While 
the certificate of sale is held by the Coun-
ty, the treasurer shall not sell for taxes 
the property covered by sneh certificate, 
but the sale under any such assessment 
muRt be postponed until the time for re-
demption under the previous sale shall 
have expired.'' 
'fhat provision of the statute has been strictly fol-
lowed by the ass.essor of Davis County, and the 
taxes against this property for the years subse-
quent to 1933 have been assessed in the same man-
ner as if the property had not been sold. So there 
h-: absolutely no merit whatever to the question 
whether or not Farnworth later disposed of some 
or all of his interest in the property. There is no 
question raised at all about the y·alidity of the 
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assessment for the year 1933. Further1nore, Sec-
tion 80-10-38 provides as follows: 
''Whenever property is sold for the non-
payment of delinquent taxes, and the 
assessment is valid in part and void as to 
excess, the sale must not for that cause be 
deemed invalid, nor shall any grant subse-
quently n1ade thereunder be held insuffi-
cient to pass a title to the grantee, unless 
the owner of th(.l! property or his agent, not 
less than six days before the time at which 
the property is advertised to be sold, de-
livers to the treasurer a protest in writing 
signed by the owner or agent, specifying the 
portion of the tax which he claims to be 
invalid, and the wound upon which . such 
claim is based. '' 
There is no evidence before the court that the owner 
or anyone interested in this property ever made 
any protest to the treasurer specifying that any 
portion of the taxes assessed against this land was 
invalid. The contention of eounsel beginning with 
the last paragraph on page 10 of their brief, that 
the 1933 taxes were actually paid is insupportable 
in view of 
Reetion 80-10-59, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, as Amended by the Session Laws 
of Utah, 1935, 
which provides the manner of redemption for real 
estate taken over by the County for delinquent 
taxes. That ~ection specifically provides that re-
rlemption certificate cannot issue fr01n a tax sale 
until ''all of the taxes subsequently assessed and 
all interest, penaltie~ :=1nd costs'' that have acrrued 
thereon are paid. That same ~wction provirlPs, 
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however, that any person wishing to make pay-
ntents toward redemption may do so in any sum in 
excess of $10.00 and then provides further how the 
treasurer may apply such partial payments and 
how the same shall be distributed, as fol1ows: 
''First, against the interest accrued upon 
the delinquent tax for the last year includ-
ed in said delinquent account at the time 
of payment; 
'' Second, againHt the penalty charged upon 
the delinquent tax for the last year included 
in the delinquent account at the time of 
payment; 
''Third, against the delinquent tax for the 
laRt year included in the delinquent account 
at the time of payment; 
''Fourth, against the interest accrued up-
on the delinquent tax for the next to last 
year ineluded in the delinquent account at 
the time of payment; 
''And so on until ther full amount of the de-
linquent tax, penalty and interest upon the 
unpaid balances shall have been paid with-
in the period of redemption as aforesaid. 
(L. '33, Ch. 61, Sec. 1, amending Rev. St. 
'B3, Sec. 80-10-59)." 
In the case before the Court the treasurer \did ex-
actly as the last mentioned section of the statute 
requireB that he mm~t do. 'Vhen Farnworth paid 
the s·aid sum of $164.43 the treasurer applied it to 
the taxes £or the last year, which was the year 1937, 
with its penalty, interest and ~costs, and then 
applied the balance on the 1936 taxes. 
The section last cited also provides that anyone 
whosP property has been sold for taxes, and for 
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7 
which the four year period allowed for re-
demption has not expired, may have the re-
demption period extended for an additional 
year by paying an runount equal to that part 
of the delinquent tax which is four years delin-
quent, plus penalty, plus accrued interest on such 
delinquent tax1 which accounts for ~1r. · Farnworth 
paying the exact amount of the taxe,s £or 1933 plus 
penalty, interest and costs, so precisely s.et out by 
counsel on page 11 of their brief. 
In answer to that we merely refer again to 
Section 80-10-59, Session Laws of Utah, 
1933, and to 
Section 80-10-61 as Amended by Session 
Laws of Utah, 1935. 
These statutes simply make it impossible to pay 
the taxes for the year upon which the sale is hased 
without paying all subsequent taxes because only 
une certificate of sale can he issued for a piece of 
real estate so long as any delinquent taxes remain 
unpaid, or unsettled, by the Board of County Com-
missioners or the State Tax Commission and there 
ran be no redemption until ran delinquent taxes 
have been settled. 
The issues presented by this appeal were all care-
fully analyzed and discussed by the trial judge in 
a very full and complete opinion which appears as 
a part of the files of this appeal, and the appellant 
adopts this opinion and the reasoning and citations 
ro! therein as sustaining his position on this apPeal 
and respectfully refers this Court to a careful con-
~ ~ideration of the said opinion without repeating or 
~~ setting it forth in detail in this brief. 
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II. 
The appellants enunwrate the jurisdictional re-
quirements of the valid ' ..May sale as follows: (a) a 
proper notice of the time and place of sale publish-
ed in a newspaper having general circulation in the 
county; (b) that less than the entire tract was 
offered for the amount of the taxes properly assess ... 
ed; (c) that no sufficient bid was made for less than 
the whole· of the property; and (d) that the p:rbp-
erty was sold for the amount of taxes properly 
ass·essed. (Appellants' brief, p. 18). As to the 
first requirement appellants say, ''although a 
notice was put into evidence there was no proof 
that it was published in a newspaper having general 
c~irculation in the county or that it was posted in 
five public places. The Revised Statutes, Section 
t>2-1-1 tells us what a newspaper of general cir-
culation is and Section 104-50-2 provides: 
''Evidence of the publication of a docu-
ment or notice required by law or an orJer 
of a court or jndge to be pu hlished iu the 
n~wspaper may he given l1~· the affi<lavit of 
the printer of the ncw~paper O·l' his fore-
man or principal clerk annexed to a copy 
of the document or notice providing the 
dateR when a~d the paper in "·hich the puh-
11rntion was made.'' 
In this case the affidavit annexed to a copy of the 
notice was filed but the point made hy appellants 
is whether the affidavit is prima facie evidence that 
the newspaper, The Weekly Reflex, was a news-
paper of g1eneral circulation in Davis County. We 
are not aware of any Utah decision on the precise 
quegtion. In analogous matters it has . been held 
that the affidavit should show that the newspaper 
is one of the character in which the statute author-
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izes publication to be n1ade (2 Bancroft Code Pr. 
and Rem. 1373, Sec. 949.) ; and ''unless otherwise 
provided by statute, the affidavit need not contain 
the numerous details as to the character of the news-
paper; and in the absence of sufficient evidence to 
the contrary a publisher's affidavit reciting that. 
the newspaper iB properly qualified is sufficient to 
establish the fact that the newspaper is a legal 
newspaper.'' 
7 Bancroft Code Pr. and Rem. 77:39, Sec. 
5851. 
In 61 C. J. 1182, Sec. 1595, it is said: 
~'The prescribed 1nethod of proof is usual-
ly an affidavit made and recorded by an 
officer or the printer in whose paper the 
advertisement was published with a copy 
of the advertisement or newspaper annexed 
thereto," - citing Rafferty v. Davis, 54 
Or. 77, 102 P. 305; Herr v. Graden, 59 
Colo. 372, 148 P. 863 .. 
The second requirement specified by the appellants 
is "that less than the entire tract was first offered 
for the amount of the taxes properly assessed.'' 
The Revised Statutes_ of Utah, '33, 80-10..:68 as 
amended by the laws of Utah, 1933, Chapter. 62, 
Section 1 provided that at the May sale of property 
the county commissioners should offer for sale ''to 
the hi_qhest bidder" each parcel of real est.ate 
which had been conveyed to the county during the 
current year, and provided that 
"the fir~t bid received in an amount suffi-
ric>nt to pay th<> taxP~. penalties, interest 
and cm:ts, inclnding all taxes assessed suh-
Rermently to the date of the certificate of 
Rale shall b{lo accepted, unless a further 
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bid in an anwunt sufficient to pay said 
taxes, penaltiest interest and costs for less 
than the entire parcel shall be received and 
the highest bid shall be construed to mean 
the bid of that party who will pay in cash 
the full amount of the taxes, penalties, in-
terest and costs for the smallest portion of 
the entire parcel." 
It will be observed that the statute does not requirQ 
that less than the entire parcel should be first offer-
ed nor does that or any other statute provide that a 
record shall be made of the method of sale adopted 
at the auction. It is not required that an explana-
tion of the method of sale shall be contained in the 
notice of sale, nor that it shall be explained by the 
.crier at the auction. The tax deed td the plaintiff 
recites that the property had been duly advertised 
and sold to the "highest bidder" which, according 
to the statute, is the purchaser even if he only paid 
an amount sufficient to pay the taxes, etc., for the 
entire parcel. If any method of procedure is in· 
· dieated in the statute it is that the auctioneer 
should first ask for bids for the entire parcel and 
then ask for further bids for less than the entire 
parcel. Se·e 
LeCompte v. Smith, 82 Kan. 543; 108 P. 
R10 
Tieman v .. J ohns.on, 114 La. 112; 38 So. 7!). 
~ everthel~ss. whether the bid of the person who 
offers to pay the taxes for the entire parcel or the 
bid of the person who offers to pRy the taxes for 
~eR~ tl1an the entire parf'Pl is Rccept.ed, that person 
becomes the "highest. bidder." The appellants do 
not pre~ent any authorities althoug·h in almost 
every State they ·havP. or have had simibl· statutes. 
See 
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61 C. J. 1195, 1196, 1209, 1348, Sees. 1610, 
1612, 1632, 1900, and Notes. 
\V e have no statute as in some jurisdiction~ under 
a kindred procedure that if there a1e no bids to 
pay the taxes, etc., for less than the entire parcel 
and this must appear of record. 
61 C. J. 1195, Section 1611. 
In 61 C J. 1209, Sec. 1632 it is said: 
''Under a statutory requirement that the 
sale must be to the highest bidder the record 
must show that the party who purchased 
was the highest bidder." But "under a 
statute which provides that the land shall 
be sold to the ·highest bidder a sale of the 
entire tract is valid although a sale of a 
proportion of the tract would have been 
sufficient to pay the taxes due·.'' 
61 C. J. 1195, Sec. 1610, cites 
:Merchants Trust Co. v. Wright, 161 Cal. 
149; 118 P. 517. 
In 61 C. J. 1196, Sec. 1612, Note 49 (a) it 
is said: 
"Sold to the hig1hest bidder. A deed which 
recites that the land was sold to the high-
est bidder· is void. 
Carpenter v. Gann, 51 Cal. 193.'' 
That cannot be true under our statute, accord-
ing to which the purchaser on either of the alter-
native terms~ is the highest bidder. Of course a 
deed which shows that the sale was conducted con-
. trary to the statute may he void on its face. 
Wall v. Kaighn, 45 Utah 244; 144 P. 1100. 
61 f1. J. 1345, Rec. 1896. 
Finally in 
fl1 ( 1 • .T. 1209, R~e. 1.6:32, Not~ 50, it iR said: 
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''Evidence of highest bidder - where the 
record of the sale showed that by its terms 
the highest bidder should be the purchaser 
and that a certain person was the pur-
chaser it was evidence that such person 
was the highest bidder," - citing Smith v. 
Messer, 17 N. H. 420. 
The appellants say: ''In this case the property con-
Fisted of several acres divided into two parcels 
each separately described. The county commission-
ers were therefore required to first offer the par-
cels separately. The italicized statement depends 
on the point of view, consequently we deny it.'' 
In 61 C. J. 1197, Sec. 1614, it is said: 
'''A valid sale may be made of s,everal con-
tiguous tracts or parcels, which are assess-
ed as a whole. and the tax cannot be arbi-
trarily apportioned, that is, a part of a 
tract, assessed as a whoJe, cannot be sold 
for a portion of the tax, and such an appor-
tioniUent has been held in some jurisdic-
tions void, and elsewhere voidable, unless 
there is legal cause for staying· as to a 
part.'' 
The third jurisdictional requirement of a valid May 
sale specified by the appellants is, '' (c) that no 
sufficient bid was made for le~ss than the whole of 
the property.'' We are not so sure that we under-
stand this objection, but perhaps the following quo-
tation from · 
61 C. J. 1191, Sec. 1605, constitutes an 
answer: 
''It is always the intention that land offer-
ed at tax sale shall bring not less than the · 
whole amount of the taxes due on it, with 
lawful costs and charges~ and in some 
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~tate~ this i~ expres~ly required by stat-
ute, so that a ~ale for a les~ runount is in· 
valid. But this condition being fulfilled, 
the mere inadeqztacy of the price p.aid con-
sidered 1-Cith reference to the true or mar-
ket val,ue of the land is no v.alid objection 
to the sale, but gross inadequacy, of price 
may justify the courts in laying stress on 
other matters constituting in themselve~ 
only irregularities and so finding grounc~ 
to set the- sale aside. '' 
The fourth jurisdictional requirement of a valid 
'May sale specified by appellant~ is, ''that the prop-
erty was sold for the amount of the taxes properly 
assessed.'' Regarding this objection, appellants 
~ay: ''Not only is there an absence of proof of a 
valid sale, there is affirmative proof of a void sale. 
ThP amount of the taxes for the year 1933, includ-
ing interest and penalties for which the property was 
sold to Davis County was the sum of $127.40. The 
property was sold to the plaintiff for the sum of 
$643.40. The difference between the two sums 
apparently represents the amount of taxes assessed 
subsequent to the year 1933 although there was no 
{•vidence showing the amount of those assessments. 
It was established that the assessment of taxes sub-
sequent to the year 1933 was invalid.'' The basi~ 
of this objection 1~ the following statement in 61 
C. J. 1192, Sec. 1606: "If real property is sold at 
tax sale for an amount exceeding the aggregate of 
taxes~ costs, penalties, and charges for which thP-
land is legally and actually liable, in a number of 
jurisdictions the sale is entirely void and passe~ no 
title,'' - citing Asper v. ~1:oon, 23 Utah 241; 67 P. 
409. A similar- pro.pcsition is s;tated in ~1:ammoth 
ritv v. Snow, 69 Utah 204: 253 P. 680,. as follows: 
"Where there is no sufficient df'Rcript.ion of nrop-
Prt~T aRReR~ed to iit0ntify it. with rf\asonable rPrtain-
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ty, taxpa.ye-r may enjoin collection of tax or if prop-
erty is sold for non-payment of tax he may treat 
sale as nullity and have it set aside or certificate or 
deed based thereon canceled.'' 
The tax sale here is not one that the appellants may 
t~eat as a nullity for the reasons urged by thPm. 
Laws of Utah 1935, Chap. 87, 8ec. 1. 
61 C. J. 1335, Sec. 1872, Note 11 (a). 
This Court has recently held, that 
''where a description in tax sale proceed-
ings is too vague or too indefinite to 
notify the owner that it is his property that 
is being taxed and insufficient to inform 
prospective purchasers as to what prop-
erty is to he sold, the resulting tax title 
after sale is void.'' 
Ferguson v. Mathis, 96 Utah 412; 85 P. (2d) 
827. 
And in Mammoth City v. Snow, supra, this Court 
held that paym,ent of taxes by the owner under an 
assessment insufficiently describing the propertv 
was good; citing Shackleford v. McGlasken, 27 
N. M. 456; 202 P. 690; 23 A. L. R. 75. See also 61 
C .• T. 1398, Sec. 1982, note. 
In this case the owner, Alice Farnworth, paid the 
taxes for 1937 and part of them for 1936. The de-
scription of property in the assessment roll need 
not be more definite than in a tax deed, and a.R to 
the latter, it has been said {61 C. J. 1353, Sec. 1914), 
that ''in the absence of statutoTy requirement the 
deed need not follow the form appearing in the tax 
list, it being sufficient if the land be definitely 
identified even thoug-h this he in different language 
or abbreviations from the tax list;'' and, ''fur-
ther,'' if the description {in the tax deed) is such 
that it furnishes means hy which the land may be 
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identified with reasonable certainty, that is all that 
the law required. It is not necessary that the deed 
should of itself describe lands so that they may be 
located by the deed alone, but it is sufficient if the 
description contained in such deed furnishes the 
means by which the lands may be identified. The 
description may be incomplete or inaccurate, and 
yet to make the deed valid, if it leaves no doubt 
about the identity of the property, and where the 
deed is definite and certain enough to enable thoEe 
familiar with it readily to recognize the land in-
tended to be sold, a. technical inaccuracy or clerical 
error will not invalidate it. 
III. 
IX THE THIRD DiviSION OF THEIR BRIEF 
APPELLANTS ARGUE THAT THE 
COUNTY AUDITOR WAS WITHOUrl~ 
POWER TO EXECUTE A DEED TO A 
PURCHASER AT THE MAY SALE- IT 
IS RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT 
THE DEED GIVEN WAS MERELY VOID-
ABLE AND AMENDABLE BY GIVING A 
NEW DEED - BUT IF NOT, THAT NO 
DEED WAS iNECESSARY; AND, FUR-
THER, THAT APPELLANTS ARE NOT IN 
A POSrTION TO OBJECT TO THE AUDI-
TOR'S DEED. 
The discovery that the Davis County deed to the 
paintiff was executed by the wrong official was 
apparently made while appellants were preparing 
' their hrief filed here. At the trial, they only made 
the general objection to the introduction of the deed 
in evidence that it was irrelevant and incompetent. 
They did not mention the objection and rJJling in 
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the abstract of record; nor is it the 1. subject of an 
assignment of error. The appellants .Jensen, in 
their answer, pointed out specifically a.U the de-
fects which they supposed invalidated the plain· 
Hff 's title. The respondent contends, therefore, 
that those appellants are not now in a position to 
contend that the deed was invalid. rrhey contend 
that if the first deed were insufficient, they were 
~entitled to a new deed. 
There are many Court decisions holding that the ex· 
ecution and delivery of a tax title is necessary to 
vest title in the purchaser at a tax sale; but this 
Court will find that such decisions are based on the 
statutes of the particular States. rrhe Supreme 
Court of Iowa has held that ''under statutes pro-
viding that no title to land sold for taxes vests in 
grantee unless a tax deed has been executed, 
acknowledged, and recorded, until no adverse in· 
terest is divested;'' and that "a tax deed furnishes 
the taxpayer the official evidenee of his title and 
authorizes him to enter upon the possession and en-
joyment of the estate.'' The pertinent Iowa stat-
utes were cited. In 
Spaulding v. E,Ilsworth, 39 Fla. 76; 21 So. 
812. 
it was held that "a purchaser at a tax sale had not 
even a prima facie right to the land purchased by 
J1im or its po~session until the execution and de-
livery of a deed therefor;'' and the Court said that 
the deed is the final consummation of the sale re-
ferred to in this section, means the completed sale, 
accomplished hv the exe1r.ntion and deliverv of the 
deed. . The opinion shows t.hat the neeessity of a 
deed was dedueed from various statutes of that. 
State. The decision in Burgin v. Rutherford, 511 
N. J. ECl. 666; 38 A. 854, is to the sam(l effect. And 
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in 61 C. J. 1331, Sec. 1864, it is 8aid: "Under some 
statutes, it is the rule that the purchaser at a tax 
sale, by his performance of all that is necessary to 
entitle him to a deed, becomes invested with title at 
the expiration of the period of redemption, although 
the deed has not yet issued to him,'' (citing Youngs 
v. Povey, 127 Mich. 297, 86 N. W. 809; Beggs v. 
Paine, 15 N. D. 436, 109 N. W. 322); however it 
seems to be more generally held that the execution 
and delivery of a tax deed is necessary to vest title 
in the purchaser." And see 
61 C. J. 1360, 1395, Sees. 1928, 1975. 
In other States we find an opposite rule, also based 
on their statutes. In 
Cooper v. Board of Commissioners, (Old.), 
105 P. (2d) 1052, the Court held· 
''Not every statutory provision regarding 
issuance of tax deed is mandatory;'' and 
''where all official acts leading up to the 
sale of property for delinquent taxes down 
to and including a resale of such property, 
had been regularly performed and the pur-
chaser had done all that the law required 
him to do in order to entitle· him to a deed, 
purchaser's right to deed was· not lost by 
failure, neglect or refusal of county treas.-
urer to execute, acknowledge and deliver 
such dfled within the statutory time." 
In McCague Inv. Co v. Mallin, 23 Wyo. 
201; 147 P. 507, the Court said, that 
''where the time for redemption has ex-
pired, and the purchaser had paid the price 
and was entitled to a deed~ failure of thP. 
county treasurer to execute and deliver 
deed, or of the county commissioners to 
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cause it to be executed and delivered, did 
not invalidate the sale by the county.>' 
In Cavender v. Phillips, 41 N. M. 235; 67 
P. (2d) 257, 
the dissenting judge referred to New Mexico cases 
of the same kind. He said: 
"We stated in Witt v. Evans., 36 N. M. 365; 
16 P. (2d) 60, 61: 'Under the statute in 
question the deed is of slight importance. 
The sale itself, applicable from recordation 
of the certificate divests the owner of legal 
title. Section 442. The right to redeem 
from the tax here in question lapsed not 
later than January 27, 1926. (New 1\Iex-
ico~ cases). On that date the county had 
'complete legal title,' which on :March 28, 
1927, it passed to the appellant by assign-
ment of the certificate. Evidently the 
office of the deed was not to pass a legal 
title which the .grantees already had or to 
divest the original owner of a title which 
he had already lost. It was preserved in 
the s1ystem as a conventional muniment of 
title, as prima facie evidence of certain 
facts, and (originally) but not ·after re-
neal of Section 458 (Laws 1925, c. 102, SeC-
tion 28) to prevent reversion of title to the 
ori!rinal owner on failure to demand title 
within the 6 years'.'' 
Under the Utah statute the further rights of. the 
owner, as, for example, a statutory right to re-
deem, or, by action, to ·OOntest the tax title, never 
has depended on the execution of the tax deed. nor 
the rights of the owners, such as his right of pos-
session, never have depended on the execution and 
oe1iver? of the deerl. The Revised Statutes of 
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Utah l~J3, 80-10-6b, providL,d, that, "'Ihe clerk is 
authorized to execute deeds the ref or (the property) 
in the name of the county,'' and as amended by 
laws of Utah, 1933, Chapter 62, Section 1, the stat-
ute in force at the time of the sale in this case, Sec-
,_ tion 80-10-68 provided, "the county clerk is author-
ized to execute deeds for all property sold pursuant 
to this section in the name of the county and attest 
the same by his seal, vesting in the purchaser all of 
the title of the State (and others:) in the real estate 
so sold." The same section provided, that "the 
board of county commissioners shall, at any time 
after the period of redemption q,nd before the sale 
as herein provided, permit the redemption of such 
property." And see, Telonis v. Staley, (Utah), 106 
P. (2d) 163. The decision in Richardson v. State 
Tax Com., 92 Utah 503; 69 P. (2d) 515. is not 
opposed to this contention. 
The general rule is, th~at the power vested in an 
official to execute a tax deed is not exhausted until 
a de-ed is made in compliance with the law. 61 C. J. 
1333, 1360, Sees. 1870, 1928. If a specific objeCJtion 
to the admissibility of the plaintiff's tax deed had 
been made he could easily have obtained a new deed, 
and obviated the objection. In Sheafer v. Mitchell, 
109 Tenn. 181; 71 S. W. 86, it was said: Objections 
made to the reading of evide11ce and exhibits in the 
court below must be clear and specific, that the 
party may have the opportunity to cure the defect 
and not be taken by surprise when that opportunity 
may not be had." This is a well recogttlized r:ule, 
and the principle of it has widespread application. 
There is a further objection, which applies only to 
the appellants Jensen. They, in· their answer, per-
hans unnPcN;;~arily. pointPrl out a~ we have already 
stated, what they conceived were all the defect~ in 
the proceedings; and now, they are precluded from 
11rging other d(\fPC't~ .. 
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In 49 C. J. 288, Sec. 352, it is said, that "whatever 
is admitted in a special defense operates so far as 
& modification of a general denial.'' The same rule 
applies to all pleadings.. In a suit to quiet' title, the 
plaintiff may ·alleg1e his title and possession, or 
right of possession, in general terms.; hut if, after 
~Jleging title in general terms, he. attempts to set 
:out facts or sources or title by specific averments, 
the latter ordinarily c10ntrol. State v. Rolio, -71 
Utah 91; 262 P. 9.87. And if a plaintiff files a re-
ply, whether necessary or not, he must reply to the. 
whole answer or counterclaim, and his denials must 
reach everythng he intends to deny. Cain v. 
Stewart, 47 JJtah ·160; 152 P. 465. 
IV. 
THE QUESTION PRESENTED BY PROPOSI-
TION IV OF APPELLANTS' BRIEF WA~ 
NOT PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL CODRT'; 
AND THEREJ ARE NO ASSIGNMENTS OF 
ERROR PRESENTING THE POINT MADE 
BY IT EXCEPTING THE CONTRADICT-
ORY ONES CONTAINED IN THE 16TH 
ASSIGN~fENT OF ERROR, VIZ (1) THAT 
TliE PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY HIM 
"r AS HELD IN TRUST FOR DEFENDANT, 
ALICE FARNWORTH AND (2) TO AID 
AND ARSIRT HER TO DEFRAUD APPEL-
LANTS. (Ab. 94). 
The points argued under the foregoing proposition 
suggest a total departur.e from the case tried in 
the court below. As we have heretofore shown, 
the appellant, Regional A~gricultur8J Credit Cor-
poration alleged in its answer that any title vested 
in the plaintiff or claimed or asserted by him in or 
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to said property is held hy hiin in trust for the de-
fendant, Alice Farnworth; and that the· appellants 
Jensen alleged in their answers that James Farn-
worth and Alice Farnworth and D. A. Skeen pro-
cured the plaintiff to purchase said property from 
Davis County for and on their behalf and that 
the plaintiff acted merely as the agent of the Farn-
worths and Skeen in the purchase of said property. 
And that said Farnworths or Skeen furnished the 
money to the plaintiff to purchase said purported 
tax title and by reason thereof they allege that the 
actual purchasers of said tax title were said Farn-
worths or said Skeen. 
There was not a suggestion of a conspiracy to de-
fraud in the answers nor was there any evidence of 
fraud except an attempt by appellants by the . tes-
timony of the plaintiff to show what the construct-
ive fraud, which is incidental to the establishment 
of constructive trusts was. The above were the 
simple allegations· of the answers upon the issues 
made upon which the case was tried; but now appel-
lants, in their brief filed here, say: "It is impos-
sible to read the evidence even in the most casual 
manner without being at once convinced that the 
purchase of this property by the plaintiff was the 
final act of a conspiracy to deprive the appellants 
of their interest therein. The participants in the 
scheme were the oefendant Alice Farnworth, her 
attorney, D. A. Skeen. and the plaintiff." (Appel· 
lants' brief, pp. 31-32). 
The appellants Jensen attempted to ple~ad a result-
ing trust (65 C. J. 1040, Section 97) and although 
the allegation of the Recional Ag-ricultural Credit 
Corpo·ration that the plaintiff held the property 
in trust for the defendant Alice Farnworth was 
purely a conclm'!ion of law (Sav. & Loan Socjptv v. 
Davidson, 97 F. 696), we mnRt aRsume that it at-
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tempted to plead either a resulting or constructive 
trust. 
Rubin v. Midlinsky, 321 Ill. 436; 152 N. E. 
219. 
Alexander v. Spaulding, 160 Ind. 176; 66 
N. E. 219. 
The evidence does not show, nor do the appellants_ 
now cl!aim, that Alice Farnworth advanced money 
to the plaintiff with which to purchase the tax title 
and the question of a resulting trust _may he elim-
inated; and we shall argue the case on the theory 
that all the appellants by their pleadings claim is 
that plaintiff held the property as the constructive 
trustees of Alice Farnworth and D. A. Skeen. 
The law, as we understand it, is: that strangers such 
as the r appellants cannot sue the alleged promisor, 
in this case the plaintiff, to establish or enforce a 
·constructive trust in favor of the promisee, in this 
case Alice Farnworth or D .. A. Skeen; 
-Powell v. International Harvester Oo., 41 
N.D. 220; 170 N. W. 559. 
Beauchamp v. Bertig, 90 Ark. 351; 119 
S. \Y. 75-82; 23 :L. R. A. (N. S.) 659, 
665. 
Brace v. V anEps, 12 S. E. 191; 80 N. \V. 
197, 199. 
In re Reynolds Estate (Neh.L 268 N. W. 
480; 
but we shall~ as briefly as possible, refer to the 
Jaw on the question of such trusts to show that the 
appellants did not try this case in the District Court 
on the theo'ry that the plaintiff and respondents 
Farnworth and Skeen had conspired to defraud the 
appellants of their rights in the property. 
J t is held that a constructive trust arises from fraud, 
artnal or constructive, and that such a trust arises 
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not primarily from the parol agreement to acquire 
and hold property from the principal, but from 
fraud and undue influence connected therewith. 
\V estphal v. Heckman, 185 Ind. 88; 113 
N. E. 299. 
And what is called ''constructive fraud'' is shown 
in such cases as 
Harras v. Harras, 68 Wash. 258; 110 P. 
1085. 
Bryan v. Douds, 213 P. State 221; 62 A. 
929; 110 Am. St. Reports 554. 
Brood & Erie Building & Loan Ass'n v. 
Barnhard, 12 Pa. Supra 345 ; 180 A. 
386. 
It consists in such facts as these: That by reason 
of the agreement of the promisor to purchase for 
another, the latter was lulled into inactivity and 
was prevented from protecting his riglhts in the 
land or refrained from doing so and the promisor 
was enabled to secure the land at a price materially 
below its actual value. 
There is a great difference between an action to 
e~tablish an active trust which embraces only tech-
nical fraud and one that is based upon fraud as the 
substantive cause of action as for instance a con-
.spiracy to defraud . the plaintiff of his rights. AB 
was said in 
TJnkel v. Robinson, 163 Cal. 648; 126 P. 
485: 
''True, the appellant is ~eeking- to establish 
a constructive tru~t hut such a trust may 
ariRe nnder various circnm~tances which 
may embrare no element of fraud or even 
technical fraud within the law. Here the 
rom:;t.ructive trm~t which appellant en-
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deavors to have established is based on 
fraud a.s a substantive cause of action.'' 
lt has been held that a mortg·agee of land cannot 
have a tax title annulled be0ause of fraud between 
the owner of the land and the tax purchaser where 
:such fraud is not alleged in the complaint. 
Federal Land Bank v. Hili, 170 La. 118; 
129 So. 654. 
61 C. J. 1440, Section 2047. 
But whether that is generally true or not, the appel-
lants could not establish a constructive trus.t against 
Alice Farnworth and D. A. Skeen or hold them for 
a conspiracy to defraud appellants of their rights, 
unless they were parties to the action or issue. 
Holian v. Holian, 265 Mass. 563; 164 N. E. 
475. 
Meldrim v. Doyle, 12'4 Cal. App. 514; 12 P. 
(2d) 997. 
Neil v. Wideman, 59 Ark. 5; 26 S. \V. 5. 
And that would have required a cross complaint, 
which in this case was not filed. In the appellants' 
. brief we find the statement that ''the defendants 
. Alice Farnworth and D. A. Skeen conveniently de-
faulted although the latter did set up a mortgage 
in his favor given by his co-defendant.'' 1\1r. SkN~n 
filed an an_swer setting up his mortgage and he par-
ticipated in the trial so it if;; difficult to see how 
he "def•aulted" unless it is the notion of appellants' 
counsel that he should have made an i~sue of some· 
thing alleged in their answe·r, which he or Mrs. 
F'arnworth was not called upon to do. 
rrhe testimony does not shO'V a constructiYe trust, 
nor fraud of any kind. The statements of Mr. Free 
that he would protect Mrs. Farn\\~orth were too 
vague to found a constructive tru~t upon. 
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Carpenter & Carpenter v. Kingham C'Vyo.), 
109 P. (2d) ±63. 
And see 
Brown v. ~Iurray, 94 N. J. Equity 125 ;.118 
A. 53-!. 
~Iiller Y. Kyle, 107 Kans. 368; 191 P. 492. 
In the Wyoming case involving a receiver's sale, 
the court said the receiver had a right to sell his 
interest to anyone he pleased, with the consent of 
the court, and the defendant had the right to buy it, 
and added ''there was no fraud in that.'' The same 
can be said here of the plaintiff. The cases holding 
that one who is acting as an agent in the purchase 
and who takes the title in his own name is regarded 
as having purchased for his principal and will be 
held as trustee, are not in point here. Such cases 
suppose an employment, such as in the case of reaJ 
estate brokers 
Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805; 113 So. 419; · 
54 A. L. R. 1172. 
Johnson v. Hayward, 7 4 Neb. 157; 103 
X. "\V. 1058; 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 112. 
Harrop v. Cole, 85 K. J. Equ. 22; 95 A. 378. 
Jackson v. Pleasonton, 95 Va. 654; 29 S. E. 
680; 
and so it is said that an agent cannot acquire title 
at a sale of land for taxes, as whatever interest he 
does acquire will be held by him in trust for his 
principal. . 
Peabody v. Burri, 255 Ill. 592; 99 N. E. 378. 
We find the word ''agent'' often misused by the 
pleader in this class of cases, but whatever its 
meaning, there was no such employment or agency 
in thiR case. 
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In 61 C. J., Section 1996, it is said that: 
''Generally speaking, fraud in the procurement of 
a tax deed is ground for its cancellation in equity 
whether the fraud is actual or constructive,'' 
.citing, among other cases, Guldner v. Guldner, 199 
]owa 986; 203 N. W. 289, cited by appellants here-
.in. The ·only right the appellants had in the prop-
erty here in question at the time of the transaction 
here complained of, if any, was the right of re-
demption and if we ignore their claims of trust, 
all they could ask even if the plaintiff and certain 
:of the defendants had conspired to defraud them 
by causing them to lose the right of redemption 
(which, obviously, they never had the thought of ex-
ercising), was to be allowed to redeem. 
Widersum v. 'Bender, 172 :Mass., p. 36; 52 
N. E. 717. 
However, in this case, each .of the appellants in 
their pleadings asserted the trust on behalf of the 
defendants Farnworth and Skeen agains.t the plain-
tiff as trustee on the theory the title had vested in 
him. In that case the tax deed forms a part of the 
'pl,aintiff's title and in granting relief the court 
could not set aside or cancel the deed as was done 
in the cas.es cited in appellants' brief. 
Luscombe v. Grigsby, 11 S. D. 408: 78 N. W. 
357. 
This case was briefed to the Court. and in the brief 
furnished by the respondent, we said: 
The defendant, Regional Agricultural Credit Cor-
poration, pleads aR a defense. ''That any title which 
mav be ves.ted in the plaintiff or claimed or asserted 
by .him in or to said property above mentioned is 
held by him in trust f.o,r the defendant, Alice Farn-
worth, and said. plaintiff has no estate, right, title, 
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or character prior or superior to the lien of this de-
fendant's judgment and decree as aforesaid,'' and 
further, that the defendant, Alice Farnworth, ''is 
now the owner in fee simple of said property sub-
jected to the lien of this defendant's judgment and 
decree" set forth in the answer. 
The purport of this defense, (and it is only such) 
would therefore seem to be, that while Alice Farn-
worth is the owner of the legal title, and probably 
that defendants ,Jensen are the owners of the equit-
able title, both of these titles are subject to an equity 
in favor of the Regional Agricultural Credit Cor-
poration. Many actions to quiet title, and perhaps 
of ejectment, have reached the Supreme Court of 
this State in which the defendant alleged or claimed 
that the plaintiff held the legal title as a construc-
tive trustee for him. Preliminarily, we shall men-
tion the following cases of that character: 
Kahn Y. Old Telegraph ~lin. Co., 2 Utah 
174. 
Silver City ~fin. Co. v. Lowry, 19 Utah 
334; 57 P. 11. 
Scott v. Crouch, 24 Utah 377; 67 P. 1068. 
He1~trom v. R.odes, 30 Utah 122; 83 P. 730. 
In this case, the theory of the defendant, Regional 
Agricultural Credit Corporation, is, that the plain-
tiff bought the tax title from Davis County at the 
request and for the benefit of Alice Farnworth; 
although he used his own money ,for that purpose. 
We shall concede, f,or the purpose of this argument 
that a plaintiff, including a c.ounter-complainant, 
may seek to have a constructive trust established 
in certain propertY, and. in the same action ask to 
ha,re his title quieted. Upon proper pleading-s tnat 
mnY hr ilonP. 
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California Trust Co. v. Coihn, 114 Cal. App. 
763; 299 P. 811. 
Thompson v. Reynolds; 59 Ut. 416; 204 P. 
576. 
American Min. Co. v. Trash, 28 Idaho 642; 
156 P. 1136. 
By that we mean that if in an action to quiet title, 
equitable relief is asked for, sufficient grounds 
therefor must be pleaded. It was so held in 
Glasmann v. O'Donnell, 6 Ut. 446; 24 P. 
537, 
and numerous Utah and other cases, which we shall 
hereinafter mention. 
It is elementary, that one of the necessary elements 
to sustain an action to quiet title is, that plaintiff 
must be the owner, either legal or equitable, of the 
title s·ought to be quieted (51 C. tT. 247, Sec. 224), 
and it has been often held, as in 
State v. Rolio, 71 Ut. 91; 262 P. 987, 
that ''in an action to quiet title, the plaintiff may 
allege his title, ownership, and possession in gen-
eral terms, and thereunder p.rove whatever title he 
has.'' But the procedure of the defendant Regional 
Agricultural Credit Corporation is not so simple. 
It is in the position of a plaintiff who is seeking to 
have a trust established, and, in the same action 
a.sking to have his title quieted. The ordinary pro-
cedure in establishing a constructive trust .is that 
pursued in 
Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Ut. 48; 95 P. 527, . 
in which the plaintiff pleaded the defendant's ver-
bal promise to purchase plaintift's property at 
foreclosure sale and convey it to heT, and also the 
fraud characterizing the promise. And in a case 
like that h~fore the Court,' the principal relief 
sought is the estahishment of a constructive trust, 
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and the prayer to quiet title is nterely incidental to 
that principal relief. 
It is the law of this State, and, we presun1e, in most 
of the States, that if the plaintiff, in an action to 
quiet title, alleg-es title or ownership in general 
terms, the defendant 1nay, under a general denial, 
p1~ove 'fraud; but that does not mean that he may 
prove a constructive trust, and the fraud essential 
to its establishment} without specially pleading the 
fraud. This is illustrated by the case of 
Steinour v. Oakley State Bank, 45 Idaho 
472: 262 p. 1052. 
In that case, a mortgage had been foreclosed against 
plaintiffs, and, as they alleged, they failed to re-
deem within the statutory time, because they were 
misled by the agreement or voluntary assurance of 
the purchaser that they should have additional time 
to redeem. The Court, citing ' 
Security State Bank v. Kramer, 50 N. D. 
20; 198 N. W. 79, 
(to which the cases therein cited, we invite the 
Court's especial attention) compared the case to 
one of trust and fraud, in which: the remedy is ex-
clusively in equity. The plaintiff, had however, 
brought an ordinary action to quiet title, alleging 
ownership in general terms ; and regarding this 
the Court says: 
"Appellants (plaintiffs) have wholly failed 
to ask the trial eourt for an award permit-
ting them to redeem, nor have they pleaded 
any facts on which they could predicafe 
such a request. Not until a court of equity, 
upon a proper bill, shall have awarded the 
right to redeem and the redemption has 
been effected, ran appellant have any title 
to f!Hiet." 
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The Court said that the rule which, in quiet,ing title 
cases, permits instr-uments to be attacked fo~ fraud, 
?S confined to cases of fr.aud in the executwn,. de-
livery, etc., of instruments. The Utah cases are to 
the same effect; and so in 
Silver City Min. Co. v. Lowry, 19 Ut. 335; 
57 P. 11, an action to quiet title, the 
Court said: 
''If true, the respondent (plaintiff) is mis,.. 
taken in the remedy which would be to bring 
an action in equity to compel the owners of 
the Clarissato deed it to the respondent on 
the ground that the appellants were trus-
tees of the respondent.'' 
In Kahn v. Old Telegraph :Min. Co., 2 Ut. 
17 4, 195, it was said: 
"\Vhile it is conceded that, under the sys-
tem of code pleading, an equitable defense 
may be set up in an action of ejectment, it 
is also well settled that such defense must 
contain all the essentials of a bill in equity, 
:1nd the issue thus made is triable by the 
court without a jury, as an equitable issue.'' 
And the Court held (see 19th paragraph of syl-
lahus), that -
''In an action of ejectment, the question is 
as to who has the better title; therefore. 
before the defendant e.an prevail on an in-
ferior or equitable title, he must first, in 
equity, subject the better title to him. He 
must become an actor and invoke equitable 
::1ffirmative relief.'' 
If the le,ga.I title to the property involved stands in 
)np party, and the othPr rlaims a constructive trust, 
the burden is upon the lath~r to show that the holder 
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of the legal title is not entitled to retain it, but 
holds it in trust for hin1. 
Scott v. Crouch, :24 Ut. :377; 67 P. 1068. 
And as the defendant, Regional ..:\grienltural Credit 
Corporation, claims that the plaintiff boug-ht the 
county's tax title for Alice Farnworth, it should 
have alleg·ed and pro,·ed facts showing that the pur_. 
chase was false and fraudulent. This, that defend-
ant has failed to do. 
In 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. (4th Ed.), 
in discussing this section it is said that, under the 
circumstances mentioned by him, ~quity impresses 
a trust even ''in favor of one who is truly and equit-
ably ·entitled to the same, although he n1ay never 
perhaps have had any legal estate therein,'' and we 
shall not deny that if there had been a transaction 
between the plaintiff and Alice Farnworth, which 
was pretended and collusive, and under which ::1\ttrs. 
F1arnworth remained the beneficial owner, the 
rlefendant, Regional Agricultural Credit Corpora-
tion might ask for a judicial declaration of a trust 
in her favor and that that defendant's judgment 
continued as a lien thereon. But we do not believe 
that the named defendant could, any more than a 
stranger, enforce as a constructive or other tru;:t, 
the voluntary a!,rreement of the plaintiff. if any suPh 
agreement were made, to purchase the tax title to 
Mrs. Farnworth's property and convey the same 
to her. The evidence does not show such an agree-
ment, but if it did, it wo•uld not he a sufficient basis 
of a constructive or other trust, nor does the evi-
dence show the fraud which must characterize the 
agreement. ''The fraud,'' it was said in 
Beebe v. BPPhc, 252 N. Y. S. 310, 
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must be something more than a mere breach of an 
agreement." In 
Funk v. Engel, 235 Niich. 195; 209 N. W. 
160, 
it was said that, "Defendant's breach of his prom-
ise to do certain acts in the future is not, standing 
nlone, fraud.'' And in 
X eagle v. McMullan, 334 Ill. 163; 165 N. E. 
605, 
1t was held, that "mere breach of grantee's oral 
promise to hold property conveyed for another 
does not constitute sueh fraud as to take the case 
out of the statut~ of frauds." 
'rhe respondent also cited 
IYrs v. Granger, 42 Utah 608; 134 · P. 169. 
Deseret Irr. Co. v. Bishop, 92 Utah 220; 
67 P. 210. 
In all of the cases we have cited, the plaintiff or 
counter-complainant S'Oru.ght to establish a construc-
tive trust; and the rule ordinarily applied to such 
cases is stated, in 
Jos,eph v. Evans, 338 Ill. 11; 170 N. E. 10, 
to be that ''an oral agreement for the conveyance 
of real estate to be enforceable must be clear and 
definite in the terms, free from doubt and suspicion 
and for a valuable consideration.'~ In 
Helstrom v. Rodes, 30 Ut. 122; 83 P. 730, 
.Justice Straup referred to the insufficiency of the 
complaint and findings relating to a trus,t, as fol-
lows: 
"It is not alleg~d in the answer nor found 
hy the court, that in locating the claim or 
obtaining the patent, plaintiff or the own-
ers of the Lily Lode were guiltv of any 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
33 
fraud or wrong, or that any act or thing 
was done by the1n to defeat any right of 
the defendant or his grantee, nor does the 
evidence sho\Y any such facts.'' 
Counsel in their brief have picked out isolated parts 
cf the ·testimony which, standing alone, m.ight just-
ify an inference that Jlr. Free intended to permit 
the Farnworths or Mr. Skeen to buy this property 
back from him. He states he was not interested in 
owning a farm and did not want a farm but had a 
moral interest in the Farnworths. There is no tes-
timony that he ecer talked with Mrs. Farnworth 
about buying this property. He did talk with Mr. 
Farnworth, Jr., whom the record shows had no in-
terest in the property at all. He looked to -Mr. 
Skeen for an assurance that the title would be clear 
or he would have a first lien on the property for 
his money. No note was taken; no ag'reement made, 
011al or written, which placed Free under any obliga-
tion to Mrs. Farnworth. Later, beca;use of the 
'mortgage, Mr. Skeen had against the property, Mr. 
Free gave Mr. Skeen an option to buy the property. 
For the option :Mr. Skeen agreed to clear the title 
and, upon exercise of the option, to pay the money 
advanced, with interest, and all expenses incurred 
by Mr. Free. Such an option was perfectly legal 
.and proper, and we repeat neither Mr. Skeen nor 
~vfr. Free thereby incurred any obligation to the 
Farnworths or anyone else interested in the 
property. 
None of the partieR intere8tNl saw fit to exercise 
the right given to them to huv the property, so why 
should they now complain?. We snhmit that an ex-
amination of the evidence on this nhase clearly 
PstahlisheR a valid tax sale. and no relation, agree-
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ment or obligation of the plaintiff Free, indicated. 
by the evidence or the law, could prevent him from 
being a bona fide legal purchaser of this property 
from the county at tax sale with the right to hold, 
,:resell or handle the property as he might see fit. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
the trial court should he in all respects affirmed 
with costs to the respondent. 
ROBERT L. CRAN1IER 
AND CHRIS 1\iATHISON, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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